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IN THE COURT t)V APPEALS
I OK llll

SI AII

DARYL GENE CAAL'WE,

OF I TAII

)

Defendant and Appellant.
vs.

)
)

Case No. 92-6703705-CA

KAYCAArWE,
I'lainuil and Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
DARYL GENE CAAUWE

JURISDICTION
he Court y^\ Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
r<

"""** Ooes federal law preclude a state i••••\n- :\ -i ;r.-atint: "voluntary separation

incentive pay" j'rom the armed forces pursuant tr- !<> ' '-' '

' ' 75 as man-.:1

1\ subjtvt

..L .::;,_; Drought by the former spouse?
• • At
• lard,

'ucstions oi lau are teC-v-ed ..nae:- a correcti« v. <>' crivr

giving no deference to the trial court. Maxweu v.

Issue; Are payments to defendant under the Voluntary Separation Incentive program
nonmarital property acquired after \\w divonr?

Standard of Review: Correction of error. Maxwell 796 P.2d at 404.
Issue: Did the Utah trial court have jurisdiction to modify the decree of divorce
entered in South Carolina?
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Maxwell 796 P. 2d at 404.
Issue: Does the evidence support the trial court's findings that defendant has the
ability to pay plaintiffs attorney's fees, and that plaintiff is in need of having her attorney's
fees paid?
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Rasbandv. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336
(UtahApp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from an order of the Second Judicial District Court for Davis County,
State of Utah, the Honorable W. Brent West, granting plaintiffs petition to modify the decree
of divorce.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In February 1971, defendant/appellant Daryl Gene Caauwe O'Daryl") enlisted in the
United States Air Force. Tr. at 25. He married Debra Kay Caauwe ("Debra"') on March 25,
1972. Tr. at 3. In 1974, Daryl left the Air Force to attend college; he reenlisted in March
1978. Tr. at 6. In 1982, the Caauwes moved to South Carolina when Daryl was stationed at
Shaw Air Force Base. Id.
In 1991, Debra filed for divorce in South Carolina; Daryl was still on active duty as a
noncommissioned officer in the Air Force. Tr. at 6. Based on the parties' stipulation, the
court entered a decree of divorce on September 10, 1991. R. at 131-149. The decree awarded
Debra an interest in 50% of Daryl's net disposable retired or retainer pay, to be paid by the Air
Force directly to Debra pursuant to the Uniform Services Former Spouse Protection Act,
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ecree incorporated the
parties' stipulation that Daryi would not "pursue any course of action that would defeat the
Spouses niiht T" ^eei* j a portion ul ine lull net iisposabk
,_ a ny action by merger * : . .

.Vienna*-;

* :
..,.

.i.emeni pension M> a> a

e a nmitatu i: .;. & amount of the total net monthI> retirement or retainer pay in which
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».. v. *. ;.

7.
. ^ ra moved u> Minnesota with *hc parties' two children. Tr. at 3.

i was transferred u Hill Air force

BUM*

a

Daryi remarried Tr. at 24. The parties

T

} h sn the ;; < • Dungest daughter,
u^v. Luii^ . - utn - iivc \.ih- i -in. r:c parties agreed to modify' the divorce decree to
award Dan I custody and child support for Tammy.

Vr

'i* " * '•

- i.»- — •

^* According'
^

• n Iamm> > ining arrangement

w at 27-2%

Debra $100 a month a

„.ij \\ai\cu cin\ .iLirv. :i- aimuMiv
\ 'ieu. ^ aoiuf

house, re^a^ed Dehra f * >

iwilecting the change

A feu months later the parties agreed to

modify the South Carolina decree again—Debra reiea^
.

aie

•K.
i.i a\vhange. Uaiyi agreed to pay

••. - hei share ol -he Laua!^ a "v s^ir^ Carolina

••!.-.

ai « . .> .ateresi I. Uebia ^ pnaht-sharing pian wvin -er employe, R ai 2C>-M judge

c .n i

Memmott entered an order reflecting this agreement on August

"

°* H at ^2-"3.

In Decern1* "
f

\i-.^ a. .. von- arn nidi *

^uj-i .t • :xulaiiuii.\ Neparateo ana reeene nothing,
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. ._ j

noil Incentive (VSI)
tgress in 1

" ^ nart

< . a program to reduce the size of the anned forces by providing financial incentives to
c:v.ourage members, who otherwise would face selection for invol

3

-^'*

e

voluntarily. Under the VSI program, a member of the armed forces receives separation pay in
annual installments for a period of time twice the length of his active duty service. The
member must remain in a reserve component for the entire time. On December 31, 1992,
Daryl was released from active duty and transferred to a reserve component. He received the
first VSI installment on or about December 31, 1992. Since Daryl had more than seventeen
years of creditable military service, he will receive annual payments of $9,473.17 for thirtyfive years.
On December 11, 1992, Debra filed a petition to modify the divorce decree to award
her 50% of the "early out" or incentive bonus Daryl received from the Air Force.

An

evidentiary hearing on the petition was held before the Honorable W. Brent West, Second
Judicial District Court for Davis County, on April 23, 1993. On May 25, 1993, the court
issued a written decision granting Debra's petition to modify the South Carolina divorce
decree and ordering Daryl to pay Debra 50% of his annual net disposable VSI payments.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Federal law precludes a state court from treating VSI payments as marital property
subject to equitable division. In the absence of express legislation to the contrary, the federal
statutory scheme of providing for payments of benefits to military personnel preempts state
laws pertaining to community property or equitable division of property upon divorce.
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581 (1989). The
Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, which expressly
permits state courts to treat military retired pay as marital property, does not apply to
separation pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1175. Therefore, the trial court lacked authority to order
Daryl to pay Debra 50% of his VSI payments.
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Further, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the South Carolina divorce decree
to include Daryl's VSI payments as part of the marital estate.
The trial court also erred in awarding Debra attorney fees when the court failed to
make the requisite findings of financial need of the receiving party and ability of the other
party to pay.
ARGUMENT

I.

FEDERAL LAW PRECLUDES A STATE COURT FROM
TREATING VSI PAYMENTS AS MARITAL PROPERTY
SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE DIVISION

In McCarty, 453 U.S. at 210, the Supreme Court held that the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution precluded a state trial court from dividing military retirement
pay pursuant to California community property laws. Citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439
U.S. 572 (1979), the court employed a two-step analysis. First, the court found that the wife's
asserted right to her husband's military pay conflicted with the express terms of federal law.
The court concluded that the statutory language indicates that Congress intended that military
retired pay be the personal entitlement of the retiree. Second, the court concluded that the
application of community property laws would frustrate the objectives of the federal military
retirement scheme: to serve as an inducement for enlistment and reenlistment, to create an
orderly career path, and to ensure a youthful military by providing an incentive to retire.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, recognized the plight of the ex-spouse of a
military retiree, but stated Congress must decide whether to afford more protection to the
former spouse of a retired service member: "[I]n no area has the Court accorded Congress
greater deference than in the conduct and control of military affairs." Id. at 236.
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As a direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in McCarty that federal law
completely preempted the application of state community property law to military retirement
pay, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Former Spouse's Protection Act (USFSPA),
10 U.S.C. § 1408 (Supp. 1993). The USFSPA has two basic parts: First the act authorizes
state courts to treat military retirement pay as property divisible upon divorce of the retiree.
10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (Supp. 1993) provides: "Subject to the limitations of this section, a
court may treat disposable retired or retainer pay payable to a member . . . either as property
solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law
of the jurisdiction of such court." Second, the USFSPA creates a mechanism for the federal
government to make direct payments to former military spouses who present state court orders
for payment of child support, alimony, or payments connected to the treatment of retired pay
as marital property. 10 U.S.C. § 1408(d) (Supp. 1993).
The USFSPA applies to "retired pay"--pay received by a member of the armed forces
upon retirement. In order to be eligible for retirement, a member must have a minimum of
twenty years of creditable active service in the armed forces. A member who is involuntarily
discharged with less than twenty years of active service is entitled to separation pay under
10 U.S.C. § 1174 (Supp. 1993). The USFSPA does not apply to separation pay. Kuzmiak v.
Kuzmiak* 222 Cal. Rptr. 664 (Cal. App. 1986) (the definition of "disposable retired pay" does
not include separation pay).
In Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, the only United States Supreme Court decision to apply the
USFSPA, the court strictly construed the act to exclude military retirement pay waived by the
retiree in order to receive veteran's disability benefits as property divisible upon divorce. The
court found that the legislative history, as a whole, indicated that, while Congress intended to
create new benefits for former spouses, it also intended to place limits on state courts designed
to protect military retirees, and that to adopt the former spouse's view would "thwart the
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obvious purposes of the Act." Id. at 594. Again, the court noted that, although it realized its
decision might harm many former spouses where retirees elected to receive disability benefits
in lieu of retirement pay, it was up to Congress to change the language of the statute.
On December 5, 1991, Congress enacted temporary legislation designed to downsize
the Armed Forces by providing personnel not yet eligible for retirement with a financial
incentive to leave the armed forces. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. 102-190, §§ 661(a)(1) and 662(a)(1), 105 Stat. 1394-1396 (1991).
(Codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1174a and 1175). R. at 64. The legislation implements a program
containing two options for those who elect to separate voluntarily in order to avoid the
possibility of selection for involuntary separation:

Under the first option, the member

receives a lump sum as separation pay, and under the second option, the member receives
separation pay in the form of an annuity. The House conference report discusses the purpose
of the legislation:
The conferees take this action because of their concern over the effect
of strength reductions during the next few years on our men and women in
uniform and their families. The conferees especially recognize that this
drawdown in strength is different from previous drawdowns because it affects
people who are the product of an all volunteer force. Therefore, the conferees
would provide these temporary authorities as tools to assist the military
Services in selectively reducing, on a voluntary basis, that portion of the career
personnel inventory that is not retirement eligible. The conferees believe that
these authorities would give a reasonable, fair choice to personnel who would
otherwise have no option but to face selection for involuntary separation, and
to risk being separated at a point not of their own choosing.
H.R.

CONF. REP. N O .

102-311, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.

1112.
In a letter to all members of the armed forces regarding the new program, the Secretary
of Defense, Dick Cheney, wrote:
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We seek to accomplish the reduction in the size of the armed forces through
means other than involuntary separation, to the maximum extent consistent
with maintaining at all times a capable, ready force. We will reduce the
number of personnel recruited into the armed forces, encourage early
retirements of retirement-eligible personnel, and take other management
measures. But even after we make effective use of these measures, we must
still reduce the size of the armed forces by many thousands more people to
achieve the planned, smaller force. We want to minimize involuntary
separations in doing so.
Consistent with the policy of avoiding involuntary separation, the Department
of Defense has developed a program of financial incentives to encourage
eligible military personnel to volunteer to leave the armed forces.
R. at 64.
The two types of financial incentives~the lump sum or SSB payments, and the annuity
or VSI payments—have features in common with involuntary separation pay under § 1174.
The amount of payment is based on the member's basic pay at time of separation, and on the
member's years in service. The member is required to serve in the Ready Reserves. The main
difference between "voluntary" separation pay under § 1174a and "involuntary" separation
pay under § 1174 is the percentage applied to reach the amount of pay—"voluntary" separation
pay is 15% of the product of the basic pay and the number of years, while "involuntary"
separation pay is 10%. Under § 1175(e)(1), the member receives an annual payment for twice
the number of years of service of the member.

The member must remain in a reserve

component for the entire length of time he or she receives the payments. The payment equals
2.5% of the product of the basic pay and the years in service. Id.
Neither §§ 1174a or 1175 mention the USFSPA or divisibility of the payments in the
event of divorce. Mansell and McCarty make it clear that, in the absence of express federal
legislation, a state court lacks the authority to treat separation pay as marital property.
Congress's failure to provide for division of the payments in the event of divorce indicates that
Congress intended that the payments be considered the separate property of the military
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member. To treat the payments otherwise would frustrate the legislative objective of reducing
the size of the military by avoiding involuntary separations. Accordingly, the trial court erred
in this case in dividing the payments.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION TO MODIFY THE SOUTH CAROLINA
DECREE OF DIVORCE.

The trial court never recited any basis for asserting subject matter jurisdiction to
modify the South Carolina decree of divorce to include Daryl's VSI payments. Debra also
never asserted basis for such jurisdiction. The South Carolina decree was simply filed in
Davis County, without even being "domesticated" as required by UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 78-22a-l etseq.
Debra styled the proceeding in which she sought to divide the VSI pay as a petition to
modify. Daryl did not raise the issue of jurisdiction and the trial court indicated that it was
enforcing the South Carolina decree, rather than modifying it. In fact, the court found that the
full faith and credit clause prohibited modification of the decree to apply the Woodward1
formula. However, it is clear that the trial court modified the South Carolina decree rather
than enforcing it. The court awarded Debra 50% of something that did not exist at the time of
the divorce. It did so without any authority.
The fact that the parties consented to previous modifications of the South Carolina
decree in Utah does not confer jurisdiction upon the court. Utah courts have repeatedly held
that subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon a court by consent or waiver and that
a judgment can be attacked for lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. E.g., Van Der
Stappen v. Van Der Stappen, 815 P.2d 1335 (Utah App. 1991); Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d
1172 (Utah App. 1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992).
1

Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), established a formula for the division of retirement
benefits, depending upon years of marriage and years of employment.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING 1 HAT DARYL HAS THE
ABILITY TO PAY DEBRA'S ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE

A trial court must base its decision to award attorney's fees upon evidence of financial
need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the reasonableness of
the fees. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah App. 1992).
Here, the trial court concluded that Daryl has the ability to pay Debra's attorney's fees
based on its finding that Daryl is employed at Wal-Mart, earning a comparable wage to Debra
($6.95 an hour), and that his wife is gainfully employed and enlisted with the Air Force. R. at
168. However, the court failed to make any findings regarding Daryl's or his wife's expenses,
nor is there any evidence in the record concerning Daryl's expenses. Thus, findings as to
Daryl's income and expenses are insufficient to support a finding that he has the ability to pay
attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
Federal law precludes a state court from treating VSI payments as marital property
subject to equitable division. In the absence of express legislation to the contrary, the federal
statutory scheme of providing for payments of benefits to military personnel preempts state
laws pertaining to community property or equitable division of property upon divorce.
McCarty, 453 U.S. 210; Mansell, 490 U.S. 581. The Uniformed Services Former Spouse's
Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408, which expressly permits state courts to treat military retired
pay as marital property, does not apply to separation pay under 10 U.S.C. § 1175. Therefore,
the trial court lacked authority to order Daryl to pay Debra 50% of his annual net disposable
VSI payments.
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The trial court erred in awarding Debra attorney's fees because there is no evidence to
support the requisite finding that Daryl has the ability to pay. The court failed to make any
findings, nor is there any evidence in the record, regarding Daryl's expenses. A finding that
Daryl is employed is inadequate to support a conclusion that Daryl has the ability to pay
attorney's fees.
Daryl respectfully requests that the Court of Appeals reverse the decision of the trial
court awarding Debra 50% of Daryl's military separation pay and ordering payment of Debra's
attorney's fees.
DATED this 10

day of November, 1993.
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2034

By.
ELLEN MAYCOCK
Attorneys forDefendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT DARYL GENE CAAUWE to the following, postage prepaid, this 10th day
of November, 1993:
Robert L. Neeley, Esq.
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, UT 84401
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ADDENDUM INDEX
1.

Decision dated May 25, 1993

2.

Findings of Fact and Order on Plaintiffs Petition To Modify Decree of Divorce dated
June 23, 1993, entered June 24, 1993
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS
Debra Kay Caauwe,
Plaintiff,

::

DECISION

::

Civil No. 926703705

vs.

:

Daryl Gene Caauwe,

:

Defendant.

:

The issue is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to 50%
of the Defendant's Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay from the
military.
Pursuant to the parties Divorce Decree, the Plaintiff
was entitled to 50% of the Defendant's monthly retirement.

After

approximately 17 plus years, the Defendant voluntarily elected to
forgo his retirement.

He took advantage of the military's

Voluntary Separation Incentive Program.

The Plaintiff contends

that the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay program was taken, by
the Defendant, in lieu of his military retirement benefits.

As

such, she claims a 50% interest in his Voluntary Separation
Incentive Pay.
On the other hand, the Defendant claims that his
Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay is separate and distinct from
his military retirement benefits.

He contends that the Voluntary

Separation Incentive Pay program has a different purpose than

Page Two
Decision

military retirement and should be treated differently.

He

further claims that the Voluntary Separation Incentive
Pay is personal property acquired after the marriage.

It is not

marital property subject to distribution to the Plaintiff.
The Court finds for the Plaintiff.
is dispositive.

The Divorce Decree

Paragraph 4K of the decree states ... that the

Defendant agrees not to merge the (Defendant's) retired or
retainer pay with any other pension, and not to pursue any course
of action that would defeat the (Plaintiff's) right to receive a
portion of the full net disposable retired
the (Defendant)

(emphasis added.)

or retainer pay of

The (Defendant) further

agrees not to take any action by merger of the military
retirement pension so as to cause a limitation in the amount of
the total net monthly retirement or retainer pay in which the
(Defendant) has a vested interest, and, therefore, the
(Defendant) will not cause a limitation of the (Plaintiff's)
monthly payments as set forth above.

The Divorce Decree further

provides that if the Defendant breaches the agreement, he will
indemnify the Plaintiff by making direct monthly payments to the
Plaintiff in the amount provided in Paragraph 4C of the decree.
Those payments are to be made under the same terms and conditions
as if those payments were made pursuant to Paragraph 4C.
Paragraph 4C of the decree gives the Plaintiff a 50% interest in
the Defendant's net disposable retired or retainer pay.

See

Page Three
Decision

paragraph 4F of the Divorce Decree for a definition of "net
disposable.")
By taking advantage of the military's Voluntary
Separation Incentive Pay program, the Defendant has attempted to
eliminate entirely the Plaintiff's interest in his retirement
benefits.

Under the divorce decree, he agreed not to do that.

He agreed not to pursue any course of action that would defeat or
limit her interest in his military retirement.

As such, he is

required to pay her the equivalent of her 50% interest in his net
disposable retirement pay.

However, the Defendant did not earn a

full retirement from the military.

Instead, he substituted, in

its place, the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay program.
programs are similar.

Both

They both use base salary and length of

service to determine the amount of benefit.

Since the Court

can't determine from the evidence what 50% of the Defendant's net
disposable retirement pay would be, the Plaintiff is awarded a
50% interest in the Defendant's net disposable Voluntary
Separation Incentive Pay.
In addition, the Court is enforcing a South Carolina
Divorce Decree.

The decree states that the Plaintiff will

receive a 50% share of the Defendant's full retirement.

The

decree makes no provision for application of the Woodward formula
that might have been applicable had it been a Utah Divorce
Decree.

Full faith and credit requires enforcement of the South

Page Four
Decision
Carolina decree without modification under the Woodward Formula.
Finally, the Plaintiff is awarded her costs and
attorney's fees of $1,000.00 for having to bring this Petition to
enforce the Divorce Decree.

She has prevailed.

The Defendant

has the financial ability to pay Plaintiff's fees.

The Plaintiff

is in financial need of having her attorney's fees paid.

The

fees are reasonable.
Plaintiff's attorney will please prepare Findings of
Facts, Conclusions of Law and and Order consistent with this
ruling.
DATED this

2 S ^ day of May, 19 °& .
Signed_
W. Brent West
District Court Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Decision to Robert L. Neeley, Attorney for
Plaintiff, at 2485 Grant Avenue., Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401,
and to Brent E. Johns, Attorney for Defendant, at 2411 Kiesel
Avenue, JSuite 101, Ogden, Utah 84401-2391, postage prepaid, date"*
thiso^T^day of May, 199 f3 .
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ROBERT L. NEELEY #237 3
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-3646
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO MODIFY
DECREE OF DIVORCE

DEBRA KAY CAAUWE,
Plaintiff,
vs .
DARYL GENE CAAUWE,

Judge:
Civil

Defendant.

No.

926703705
VfinJ

That hearing on Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of
Divorce, having come on regularly for hearing, before the Honorable
W. Brent West, District Court Judge, on the 23rd day of April,
1993.

Plaintiff, Debra Kay Caauwe, was personally present and

represented by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley; and defendant, Daryl
Gene

Caauwe,

was

personally

attorney, Brent E. Johns.

present

and

represented

by

his

The plaintiff and defendant having been

sworn and testified; and the Court having received exhibits from
the respective parties; and being fully advised in the matter;
hereby

enters

the

following

Findings

of

Fact

and

Order

on

Plaintiff's Petition to Modify Decree of Divorce:
1.

That plaintiff obtained a Decree of Divorce from

defendant on or about the 7th day of September, 1991, in the Family
Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, County of Sumter, State of
South Carolina.
2.

Pursuant to paragraph 4(c). of the Divorce Decree,
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plaintiff was to receive 50% of defendant, Daryl Gene Caauwe's net
disposable retire or retainer pay in connection with defendant's
military retirement benefits acquired from the United States Air
Force.
3.

That pursuant to paragraph 4(k) of the Decree of

Divorce, defendant

agreed not to merge

the members

retired

or

retainer pay with any other pension, and not to pursue any course
of action that would defeat the spouses right to receive a portion
of the full net disposable retired or retainer pay of the member.
The member agreed not to take any action by merger of the military
retirement pension so as to cause a limitation in the amount of the
total net monthly retirement or retainer pay in which the member
has a vested interest and, therefore, the member should not cause
a limitation of the spouses monthly payments as set forth above.
The member agreed to indemnify the spouse for any breach of this
paragraph.
4.

The issue before the above-entitled Court is whether

plaintiff, Debra Kay Caauwe, is entitled to 50% of Defendant's
Voluntary

Separation

Incentive Pay

from the United

States Air

Force .
5.
Force's

Defendant took advantage of the United States Air

Voluntary

Separation

Incentive

Program,

and

plaintiff

contends that the Voluntary Incentive Program was taken, by the
defendant, in lieu of his military retirement benefits, and as
such,

she

claims

Incentive Pay.

a

50% interest

in

his

Voluntary

Separation

The defendant claims that his Voluntary Separation

Incentive Pay is separate and distinct from his military retirement

benefits.

Defendant contends the Voluntary Separation Incentive

Pay Program has a different purpose and military retirement and
should be treated differently.

Defendant further claims that the

Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay is personal property acquired
after

the

marriage

and

is

not

marital

property

subject

to

distribution to the plaintiff.
6.

The Court finds by taking advantage of the Military

Voluntary Separation Incentive Program, the defendant has attempted
to eliminate entirely the plaintiff's interest in his retirement
benefits.

Under

the South Carolina

agreed not to do that.
of action

that

would

Divorce

Decree, defendant

Defendant agreed not to pursue any course
defeat

or

limit plaintiff's

interest

in

defendant's military retirement.
7. Under the Decree of Divorce, defendant is required to
pay

plaintiff

the

equivalent

of

plaintiff's

50% in

his

net

disposable retirement pay.

However, the defendant did not earn a

full

United

retirement

defendant

from

substituted,

the
in

States

its place,

Air

Force.

the Voluntary

Instead,
Separation

Incentive Pay Program.
8. The Court finds both programs are similar.

The Court

finds that both programs use base salary and length of service to
determine the amount of benefit.
9. Under the Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay Program,
the United

States

Air Force computed

defendant's base pay

of

$1,779.00 and multiplied the same by 213 months as defendant was
credited with serving 17 years and 9 months effective military

v_v \J tv' ^ _ ,v O

service and multiplied the same by 15% to arrive at a lump sum
benefit payment of $56,839.05. The Court received this information
based

upon Stipulation

of

the parties

pursuant

to

information

provided by response to plaintiff's Subpoena Duces Tecum.
10.

Defendant

however

elected

an annual

$9,473.17 which was arrived at by the United

annuity of

States Air

Force

multiplying defendant's base pay of $1,779.00 X 213 months X 2.5%
to arrive at an annual installment annuity of $9,473.17.
11.

Since the Court cannot determine exactly from the

evidence what

50% of defendant's

plaintiff

awarded

is

a

50%

net disposable would

interest

disposable voluntary separation pay.

in

the

be, the

defendant's

net

Defendant is ordered to pay

plaintiff, Debra Kay Caauwe, 50% of the amount received on or about
January, 1993, believed to be approximately $7,000.00 as per the
testimony of defendant.
defendant,

Daryl

Gene

Judgment is granted to plaintiff against
Caauwe,

for

the

sum

of

$3,500.00

for

plaintiff's share of defendant's initial payment.
12.
annual

annuity

Hereafter, plaintiff is to receive 50% of the net
payment

from

each

of

the

remaining

34

annual

installment payments of $9,473.17.
13.

As the Court is enforcing its South Carolina Decree

of Divorce which
portion

of

provides

defendant's

that plaintiff

full

retirement,

shall
the

receive a 50%

Decree

makes

no

provision for application of the Utah Woodward Formula that might
have been applicable had it been a Utah Divorce Decree.
14.

Full faith and credit requires enforcement of the

South Carolina Decree without modification under the Utah Woodward
Formula.
15.

That plaintiff is awarded her cost and attorney fees

of $1,000.00 for having to bring this Petition

to enforce

the

Decree of Divorce, and accordingly, judgment is granted in favor of
plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $1,000.00.
16.

The Court finds that plaintiff is gainfully employed

at Wal-Mart earning $6.95 per hour and averaging between 32 to 38
hours per week with a net pay of approximately $373.00 each two
weeks.
17.

The Court finds that defendant is likewise employed

at Wal-Mart earning a comparable wage to plaintiff but in addition,
has remarried and his wife is gainfully employed and enlisted with
the United States Air Force.
18.

The Court finds that defendant has the financial

ability to pay plaintiff's attorney's fees, that plaintiff is in
financial need of having her attorney fees paid and the fees are
reasonable and proper.
dO

DATED this I*-

day of June, 1993.

W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

BRENT E. J#HNS
Attorney for Defendant
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